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Popular Matchings 
Dav id  J. Abraham* Rober t  W.  I rv ing*  Te l ikepa l l i  Kav i tha*  Kur t  Meh lhorn*  
Abst rac t  
We consider the problem of matching a set of applicants to 
a set of posts, where each applicant has a preference list, 
ranking a non-empty subset of posts in order of preference, 
possibly involving ties. We say that a matching M is 
popular if there is no matching M' such that the nnmber 
of applicants preferring M ~ to M- exceeds the number of 
applicants preferring M to M-'. In this paper, we give the 
first polynomial-time algorithms to determine if an instance 
admits a popular matching, and to find a largest such 
matching, if one exists. For the special case in which every 
preference list is strictly ordered (i.e. contains no ties), we 
give an O(n+m) time algorithm, where n is the total number 
of applicants and posts, and m is the total length of all the 
preference lists. For the general case in which preference 
lists may contain ties, we give an O(x/n'm ) time algorithm, 
and show that the problem has equivalent time complexity 
to the maxinmm-cardinality bipartite matching problem. 
1 In t roduct ion  
An instance of the popular matching problem is a 
bipartite graph G = (A U P ,E )  and a partit ion E = 
EiOE2...OE~ of the edge set. We call the nodes in 
A applicants, the nodes in 7:' posts, and the edges in 
E i tile edges of rank i. If (a, p) E Ei and (a, p') E Ej 
with i < j ,  we say that  a prefers p to ft. I f i  = j ,  
we say that  a is indifferent between p and p'. This 
ordering of posts adjacent to a is called a's preference 
list. We say that  preference lists are strictly ordered 
if no applicant is indifferent between any two posts on 
his/her preference list. More generally, if applicants can 
be indifferent between posts, we say that  preference lists 
contain ties. 
A matching M of G is a set of edges no two of 
which share an endpoint. A node u E .,4 U ~o is either 
unmatched in M,  or matched to some node, denoted by 
M(u) (i.e. {u, M(u)} E M). We say that  an applicant a 
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Fignre 1: An instance for which there is no popular 
matching. 
prefers matching M '  to M if (i) a is matched in M '  and 
unmatched in M,  or (ii) a is matched in both M '  and M,  
and a prefers M'(a) to M(a). M' is more popular than 
M, denoted by M '  ~ M,  if the number of applicants 
that  prefer M '  to M exceeds the number of applicants 
that  prefer M to M' .  
DEFINITION 1.1. A matching M is popular if and only 
if there is no matching M' that is mor'e popular than 
M. 
Figure i contains an example instance in which ,,4 = 
{al, a2, a3}, "P = {Pt, P2, P3}, and each applicant prefers 
Pa to P2, and P2 to Pa. Consider the three symmetrical 
matchings ~fl = {(al ,P l ) ,  (a2,p2), (a3,P3)}, ~'/2 = 
{(al,p3), (a2,pl), (a3,P2)} and/~I3 = {(al,P2), (a2,pa), 
(a3,pl)}. It is easy to verify that  none of these 
matchings is popular, since ~I1 < ~I2, /lsI2 -~ /143, and 
Ma ~ Mi. In fact, this instance adnfits no popular 
matching, the problem being, of course, that  the more 
popular than relation is not acyclie. 
The popular matching pwblem is to determine if a 
given instance admits a popular matching, and to find 
such a matching, if one exists. We remark that  popular 
matchings may have different sizes, and a largest such 
matching may be smaller than a maxinmm-cardinal i ty 
matching. The maximum-eardinality popular matching 
prvblem then is to determine if a given instance admits a 
popular matching, and to find a la~est such matching, 
if one exists. 
In this paper, we use a novel characterization of 
popular matchings to give an O(x/~'m) time algorithm 
for the maximum-eardinal ity popular matching prob- 
lem, where n is the number of nodes, and m is the 
number of edges. For instances with strictly-ordered 
preference lists, we give an O(n + m) time algorithm. 
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No polynomial time algorithms were known previously. 
Related Prev ious  Work .  The bipartite matching 
problem with a graded edge set is well-studied in the 
economics literature, see for example [2, 11, 13]. It 
models some important real-world problems, including 
the allocation of graduates to training positions [9], 
and families to government-owned housing [12]. The 
notion of a popular matching, also known as a majority 
assignment, was first introduced by Gardenfors [4] 
in the context of the stable marriage problem 1 [3, 
6]. Gardenfors proved that every popular matching is 
stable, but also showed that popular matchings need 
not exist. 
For the problem setup considered in this paper, 
various other definitions of optimality have been 
studied. For example, a snatching M is Pareto optimal 
[1, 2, 11] if there is no matching M '  such that (i) some 
applicant prefers M' to M, and (iX) no applicant prefers 
M to M t. In particular, such a snatching has the 
property that no coalition of applicants can collectively 
improve their allocation (say by exchanging posts with 
one another) without requiring some other applicant o 
be worse off. This is the weakest reasonable definition 
of optimality - see [1] for an algorithmically oriented 
exposition. Stronger definitions exist: a snatching is 
rank-maximal [10] if it allocates the maxinmm number 
of applicants to their first choice, and then subject 
to this, the maximum number to their second choice, 
and so on. Rank-maximal matchings Mways exist and 
may be found in time O(min(n, Cvfz)m) [10], where 
C is the maximmn edge rank used in the matching. 
Finally, we mention maximum-utility matchings, which 
maximize ~(a,p)EM Ua,p, where Ua,p is the utility of 
allocating post p to applicant a. Maximum-util ity 
matchings can be found through an obvious transfor- 
mation to the maximum-weight matching problem. 
Neither rank-maximal nor maximum-util ity matchings 
are necessarily popular. 
P re l iminar ies .  For exposition purposes, we create a 
unique last resort post l(a) for each applicant a and 
assign the edge (a,l(a)) higher rank than any edge 
incident on a. In this way, we can assume that every 
applicant is matched, since any unmatched applicant 
can be allocated to his/her last resort. From now on 
then, matchings are applicant-complete, and the size 
of a snatching is just the number of applicants not 
matched to their last resort. We may also assume that 
instances have no gaps - so if an applicant a is incident 
]A stable marriage instance is the same as a popular matching 
instance, except hat both applicants and posts rank each other 
in order of preference. 
to a rank i edge, then a is also incident to edges of all 
smaller ranks than i. 
Organ izat ion  of  the  paper .  In Section 2, we develop 
an alternative characterization of popular matchings, 
under the assumption that preference lists are strictly 
ordered. We then use this characterization as the 
basis of a linear-time algorithm to solve the maximum- 
cardinality popular matching problem. In Section 3, we 
consider preference lists with ties, giving an O(v/:nm) 
time algorithm for the maximum-cardinality popular 
matching problem. Finally, in Section 4 we give some 
empirical results on the probability that a popular 
matching exists, and discuss an open problem. 
2 Strict ly-ordered Preference Lists 
In this section, we restrict our attention to strictly- 
ordered preference lists, both to provide some intuition 
for the more general case, and because we can solve 
the popular matching problem in only linear-time. This 
last claim is not immediately clear, since Definition 1.1 
potentially requires an exponential number of compar- 
isons to even check that a given matching is popular. 
We begin this section then by developing an equivalent 
(though efficiently-checkable) characterization f popu- 
lar matchings. 
2.1 Character i z ing  Popu lar  Match ings .  For each 
applicant a, let f(a) denote the first-ranked post on 
a's preference list (i.e. (a, f(a)) • El). We call any 
such post p an f-post, and denote by f(p) the set of 
applicants a for which f(a) = p. The following lemma 
gives the first of three conditions necessarily satisfied by 
a popular matching. 
LEMMA 2.1. Let M be any popular matching. Then for 
every post f-post p, (i) p is matched in M, and (iX) 
M(p) • f(p). 
Proof. Every f -post p must be matched in M, for oth- 
erwise we can promote any a E f(p) to p, thereby 
constructing a matching more popular than M. Sup- 
pose for a contradiction then that p is matched to some 
M(p) ¢ f(p). Select any al • f(p),  let a2 -~  M(p), and 
since all f -posts are matched in M, let a3 = M(f(a2)). 
We can again construct a matching more popular than 
M, this time by (i) demoting a3 to/(a3), (iX) promoting 
a2 to f(a2), and then (iii) promoting al to p. 
For each applicant a, let s(a) denote the first non- 
f -post  on a's preference list (note that s(a) must exist, 
due to the introduction of/(a)). We call any such post p 
an s-post, and remark that f -posts are disjoint from s- 
posts. In the next two lemmas, we show that a popular 
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matching can only allocate an applicant a to either f(a) 
or s(a).  
LEMMA 2.2. Let M be any popular matching. Then for 
every applicant a, M(a) can never be strictly between 
f(a) and s(a) on a 's preference list. 
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that M(a) is strictly 
between f(a) and s(a). Since a prefers M(a) to s(a), 
we have that M(a) is an f-post. Furthermore, M 
is a popular matching, so a belongs to f(M(a)) (by 
Lemma 2.1), thereby contradicting the assumption that 
a prelers f(a) to M(a). 
LEMMA 2.3. Let M be a popular matching. Then for 
every applicant a, M(a) is never worse than s(a) on a's 
preference list. 
Pro@ Suppose for a contradiction that al prefers (al) 
to M(al) .  If s(al) is umnatched in M, we can promote 
al to s(al), thereby constructing a matching more 
popular than M. Otherwise, let a2 = M(s(al)), and let 
a3 = M(f(a2)) (note that a2 ¢ a3, since f -posts and s- 
posts are disjoint). We can again construct a matching 
more popular than M, this time by (i) demoting a3 
to l(a3), (ii) promoting a2 to f(a2), and then (iii) 
promoting al to s(al). 
The three necessary conditions we have just derived 
form the basis of the following preliminary characteri- 
zation. 
LEMMA 2.4. A matching M is popular if and only ,if 
(i) every f-post is matched in M, and 
(ii) for each applicant a, M(a) • {f(a),  s(a)}. 
Proof. Any popular snatching necessarily satisfies con- 
ditions (i) and (ii) (by Lemmas 2.1 - 2.3). It remains to 
show that together, these conditions are sufficient. 
Let M be any matching satisfying (i) and (ii), and 
suppose for a contradiction that there is some matching 
M ~ that is more popular than M. Let a be any applicant 
that prefers M t to M, and let p~ = M'(a) (note that p~ 
is distinct for each such a). Now, since a prefers pP to 
M(a), it follows from condition (ii) that M(a) -= s(a). 
So, p' is an f-post,  which by condition (i), must be 
matched in M, say to a'. But then p~ = f(a ~) (by 
condition (ii) and since f-posts and s-posts are disjoint), 
and so a ~ prefers M to M ~. 
Therefore, for every applicant a that prefers M ~ to 
M, there is a distinct corresponding applicant a ~ that 
prefers M to Mq Hence, M p is not more popular than 
M, giving the required contradiction. 
Given an instance graph G = (A U P,  E), we define 
the reduced graph G ~ = (AUP,  E ~) as the subgraph of G 
containing two edges for each applicant a: one to f(a) ,  
the other to s(a). We remark that G ~ need not admit an 
applicant-complete matching, since l(a) is now isolated 
whenever s(a) 7~ l(a). Lemma 2.4 gives us that ~I  is 
a popular matching of G if and only if every f -post  is 
matched in M, and M belongs to the graph G ~. Re- 
call that all popular matchings are applicant-complete 
through the introduction of last resorts. Hence, the fol- 
lowing characterization is immediate. 
THEOREM 2.1. M is a popular matching of G if and 
only if 
(i) every f-post is matched in M, and 
(ii) M is an applicant-complete matching of the reduced 
graph G ~. 
2.2 A lgor i thmic  Resu l ts .  Figure 2 contains an al- 
gorithm for solving the popular matching problem. The 
correctness of this algorithm follows immediately fl'om 
the characterization i Theorem 2.1. We only remark 
that at the termination of the loop, every f -post  must 
be matched, since f(a) is unique for each applicant a, 
and f -posts are disjoint from s-posts. We now show a 
linear-time implementation of this algorithm. 
Popular-Matching(G = (.4 U "P, E)) 
G' := reduced graph of G; 
if G ~ admits an applicant-complete matching M then 
for each f-post p unmatched in M 
let a be any applicant in f(p); 
promote a to p in M; 
return M; 
else 
return "no popular matching"; 
Figure 2: Linear-time popular matching algorithm for 
instances with strictly-ordered preference lists 
It is clear that tile reduced graph G ~ of G can be 
constructed in O(n + m) time. G' has O(n) edges, since 
each applicant has degree 2, and so it is also clear that 
the loop phase requires only O(n) time. It remains to 
show how we can efficiently find an applicant-complete 
matching of G ~, or determine that no such matching 
exists. 
One approach involves computing a maximum- 
cardinality matching M of G ~, and then testing if M is 
applicant-complete. However, using the Hopcroft-Karp 
algorithm for maximum-cardinality snatching [8], this 
would take O('n 3/2) time, which is super-linear, when- 
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ever m is 0(n3/2). Consider then tile algorithm in Figure 
3. 
Appl icant-Complete-Matching(G'  = (M U 7;', E')) 
M := 0; 
while some post p has degree 1 
a := unique applicant adjacent o p; 
/~4 := MU {(a,p)}; 
G' := G' - {a,p}; / /  remove a and p front G' 
while some post p has degree 0 
G'  := G '  - {p}; 
/ /  Every post now has degree at least 2 
/ /  Every applicant still has degree 2
if IPl < IAI then 
return "no applicant-complete matching"; 
else 
/ /  G' decomposes into a family off disjoint cycles 
M t := any maximmn-cardinality nmtching of C;  
return M tO A4'; 
Figure 3: Linear-time algorithm for finding an 
applicant-complete matching in G ~ 
This algorithm begins by repeatedly matching a 
degree 1 post p with the unique applicant a adjacent 
to p. No subsequent augmenting path can include 
p (since it is matched and has degree 1), so we can 
remove both a and p from consideration. It is not hard 
to see that this loop can be implemented to run in 
O(n) time, using for example, degree counters and lazy 
deletion. After this, we remove any degree 0 posts, so 
that all remaining posts have degree at least 2, while all 
remaining applicants till have degree exactly 2. Now, 
if IP] < 1,41, G' cannot admit an applicant-complete 
matching by Hall's Marriage Theorem [7]. Otherwise, 
we have that IPl -> 1,41, and 21P I < ~peT~deg(p) =
2]A]. Hence, it nmst be the case that 1`41 = I'Pl, 
and every post has degree exactly 2. G' therefore 
decomposes into a family of disjoint cycles, and we only 
need to walk over these cycles, choosing every second 
edge. 
We summarize the preceding discussion in the fol- 
lowing lemma. 
LEMMA 2.5. We can find a popular matching, or deter- 
mine that no such matching exists, in O(n + m) time. 
We now consider the maximum-cardinality popular 
matching problem. Let ,41 be the set of all applicants 
a with s(a) = l(a), and let ,42 = ,,4 - .,42. Our target 
matching must satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 
2.t, and among all such matchings, allocate the fewest 
`4~-applicants to their last resort. 
We begin by constructing G I and testing for the 
existence of an applicant-complete matching M of ` 42- 
applicants to posts (using the Applicant-Complete- 
Matching algorithm in Figure 3). If no such M ex- 
ists, then G admits no popular matching by Theorem 
2.1. Otherwise, we remove all edges from G I that are 
incident on a last resort post, and exhaustively aug- 
ment M, each time matching an additional `41-applicant 
with his/her first-ranked post. If any Al-applicants are 
unmatched at this point, we simply allocate them to 
their last resort. Finally, we ensure that every f -post  
is matched, as in the Popular-Matching algorithm in 
Figure 2. It is clear that the resulting matching is a 
maximum-cardinality popular matching, and so we only 
comment on the time complexity of augmenting M. 
Note that an alternating path Q from an unmatched 
applicant a is completely determined (since applicants 
have degree 2). If we are able to augment along 
this path, then no subsequent augmenting path can 
contain a node in Q, since such a path would necessarily 
terminate at a, who is already matched. Otherwise, 
if there is no augmenting path from a, then it is not 
hard to see that again, no subsequent augmenting path 
can contain a node in Q. This means we only need to 
visit and mark each node at most once, leading to the 
following result. 
THEOREM 2.2. For instances with strictly-ordered pr@ 
erence lists, we can find a maximum-cardinality popular 
matching, or deterwtine that no such matching exists, in 
O(n + m) time. 
3 Pre ference  L i s ts  w i th  T ies  
In this section, we relax our assumption that preference 
lists are strictly ordered, and consider problem instances 
with ties. We begin by developing a generalization 
of the popular matching characterization, similar to 
Theorem 2.1. Using this characterization, we then 
go on to give a O(x/nm ) time algorithm for solving 
the maximum-cardinality popular matching problem. 
Note that we cannot hope for a linear time algorithm 
here, since for the special case where all edges have 
rank one, the problem of finding a popular matching 
is equivalent o the problem of finding a maxinmm- 
cardinality bipartite matching. We also remark that 
maximum-cardinality bipartite matching is at least as 
hard as popular matching, since we can simply assign all 
edges in the graph to have rank one. The two problems 
therefore have equivalent time complexity. 
3.1 Character i z ing  popu lar  match ings .  For each 
applicant a, let f(a) denote the set of first-ranked posts 
on a's preference list. Again, we refer to all such posts 
p as f-posts, and denote by f(p) the set of applicants a
for which p C f(a). 
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It may no longer be possible to match every f- 
post p with an applicant in f(p) (as in Lemma 2.1), 
since, for example, there may now be lnore f-posts than 
applicants. Below then, we work towards generalizing 
this key lemma. 
Let M be a pot)ular matching of some instance 
graph G = (A U P,  E). We define the first-choice graph 
of G as G1 = (AUP,  E1), where E1 is the set of 
all rank-one edges. For instances with strictly-ordered 
preference lists, Lemma 2.1 is equivalent o requiring 
that every f -post  is matched in M n E 1 (note that f -  
posts are the only posts with non-zero degree in G1). 
But since applicants have a unique first choice in this 
context, Lemma 2.1 is also equivalent o the weaker 
condition that M N Ea is a maximum matching of Gl. 
The next lemma shows that this weaker condition must 
also be satisfied when ties are permitted. 
LEMMA 3.1. Let M be a popular matching. Then M n 
E1 is a maximum matching of G1. 
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that M1 = M ~ E1 
is not a maximum matching of G1. Then M1 adnfits 
an augmenting path Q = (al ,pl , . . .  ,pk) with respect 
to G1. It follows that M(al) ~ f(al), and Pk is either 
unmatched in M, or M(pk) ¢ f(Pk). We now show 
how to use Q to construct a matching M '  that is more 
popular than M. Begin with M '  = M \ {(at, M(ax))}. 
There are two cases: 
(i) Pk is unmatched in Mq 
Since both al and Pk are umnatched in M' ,  we 
augment M '  with Q. 
In this new matching, al is matched with Pl (where 
pl E f (a l ) ) ,  while all other applicants in Q remain 
matched to one of their first-ranked posts. Hence 
M'  is more popular than M. 
(ii) Pk is matched in M'. 
Let ak+l = M'(pk) and note that Pk ~t f (ak+l) .  
Remove (ak+l,Pk) fi'om M'  and then augment M '  
with Q. Select any pk+l c f(ak+O. If pk+l 
is unmatched in M' ,  we promote ak+l to Pk+l. 
Otherwise, we demote a = M'(Pk+i) to either l(a) 
(if a ¢ al), or back to M(al) (if a = al),  after 
which we can promote a~+l to pk+~. It is clear 
from this that at least one of al and ak+~ prefers 
M '  to M. Also, at most one applicant (that is a) 
prefers M to M' ,  though in this case both al and 
ak+~ prefer M'.  Hence, M '  is more popular than 
M. 
We now begin working towards a generalized eft- 
nition of s(a). For instances with strictly-ordered pref- 
erence lists, s(a) is equivalent o the first post in a's 
preference list that has degree 0 in G1. However, since 
Lemma 2.1 no longer holds, s(a) may now contain any 
number of surplus f-posts. It will help us to know which 
f-posts cannot be included in s(a), and for this we use 
the following well-known ideas from bipartite matching 
theory. 
Let 3'/1 be a maximum matching of some bipartite 
graph G1 = (A U P, E1). (Note that we are using 
notation that matches our use of this theory - so Mi = 
M A El,  and G1 is the graph G restricted to rank-one 
edges.) Using M1, we can partition A U 7' into three 
disjoint sets: A node v is even (respectively odd) if 
there is an even (respectively odd) length alternating 
path (with respect to M1) from an unmatched node 
to v. Similarly, a node v is unreachable if there is 
no alternating path from an unmatched node to v. 
Denote by E, O and //g the sets of even, odd, and 
unreachable nodes, respectively. The following lemma, 
proved in [5], gives some flmdamental relationships 
between maximum matchings and this type of node 
partition. We include its proof for completeness. 
LEMMA 3.2. Let E, 0 and bt be the node sets defined 
by G1 and M1 above. Then 
(a) g, 0 and lA are pai,rnvise disjoint. Every maxim.urn 
matching in G1 partitions the node set into the 
same pa~tition of even, odd, and unreachable nodes. 
(b) In any maximum- cardinality matching of G1, every 
node in 0 is matched with some node in g, and 
every node in Lt is matched with another node in 
bl. The size of a maximum-cardinality matching is 
IOl + lul/2. 
~) No maximum-cardinality matching of Gi contains 
an edge between two nodes in O, or a node in (9 and 
a node in hi. And there is no edge in G1 connecting 
a node in £ with a node in bl. 
Proof. Assmne a node v is reachable by an even length 
alternating path ft'om the free node a and by an odd 
length alternating path from the fl'ee node b. Note that 
a ¢ b since Gt is a bipartite graph. Then v is on the 
same side as a and the composition of the paths is an 
augmenting path from a to b. Thus M1 is not maximum, 
a contradiction. 
Consider any maximum matching N in G1. Then 
Mt ® N consists of a set of alternating cycles and paths. 
Augmenting any such paths and cycles to 311 leaves the 
odd and the unreachable nodes matched and also does 
not change the even / odd / unreachable status of any 
node. 
This proves part (a). 
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Every node not reachable by an alternating path 
must be matched (otherwise it would be reachable by a 
path of length zero) and hence must be matched with 
a node which is also unreachable. Thus M1 pairs nodes 
in /14 and matches the nodes in O with nodes in g. 
(Note that there is no edge in G1 between two nodes 
of £ because nodes in g are reachable by alternating 
paths ending in a matching edge. An edge between two 
nodes of g has to be a non-matching edge and that 
can be used to construct an augmenting path, which 
contradicts the maximality of M1.) Thus the cardinality 
of M1 is [O] + [//[/2. 
This proves part (b). 
Since any maximum matching pairs the nodes in b/ 
and matches nodes in O with nodes in E, no maximum 
matching uses an edge connecting two odd nodes or an 
odd node with an unreachable node. 
Since nodes in g are reachable by even length 
alternating paths from a free node, such paths end in 
a matching edge. An edge connecting a node in g to 
a node in//g is non-matching and hence could be used 
to extend the alternating path, a contradiction to the 
definition of//4. 
This proves part (c). 
Now, since M1 is a maximum-cardinality matching 
of G1, Lemma 3.2(b) gives us that every odd or un- 
reachable post p in G1 must be matched in M to some 
applicant in f(p). Such posts cannot be members of 
s(a), and so we define s(a) to be the set of top-ranked 
posts in a's preference list that are even in G1 (note 
that s(a) ¢ 0, since l(a) is always even in G1). This 
definition coincides with the one in Section 2, since de- 
gree 0 posts are even, and whenever every applicant has 
a unique first choice, posts with non-zero degree (i.e. 
f-posts) are odd or unreachable. 
Recall that our original definition of s(a) led to 
Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, which restrict the set of posts 
to which an applicant can be matched in a popular 
matching. We now show that the generalized efinition 
leads to analogous results here. 
LEMMA 3.3. Let M be a popular matching. Then for 
every applicant a, M(a) can never be strictly between 
f(a) and s(a) on a's preference list. 
Pro@ Suppose for a contradiction that M(a) is strictly 
between f(a) and s(a). Then since a prefers M(a) to 
any post in s(a) and because posts in s(a) are the top- 
ranked even nodes in G1, it follows that M(a) must 
be an odd or unreachable node of G1. By Lemma 
3.2(b), odd and unreachable nodes are matched in every 
maxinmm matching of G1. But since M(a) ~ f(a), 
M(a) is unmatched in M n El. Hence M is not 
a maximum matching on rank-one edges and so by 
Lemma 3.1, M is not a popular matching. 
LEMMA 3.4. Let M be a popular matching. Then for 
every applicant a, M(a) is never worse than s(a) on a's 
preference list. 
Pro@ Suppose for a contradiction that M(a l )  is 
strictly worse than s(al). Let Pl be any post in s(at). 
If Pl is unmatched in M, we can promote al to Pl, 
thereby constructing a matching more popular than M. 
Otherwise, let a2 = M(pl). There are two cases: 
(a) p, ~ f(a2): 
Select any post P2 E f(a2), and let aa = M(p2) 
(note that P2 must be matched in M, for otherwise 
Lemma 3.1 is contradicted). We can again con- 
struct a matching more popular than M, this time 
by (i) demoting a3 to l(a3), (ii) promoting a2 to P2, 
and then (iii) promoting al to Pl- 
(b) Pl E f(a2): 
Now, since Pl E s(al) as well, it must be the case 
that Pl is an even post in G1. It ibllows then that 
G1 contains (with respect o MAE1) an even length 
alternating path Q' = (pl,a2, ...,Pk), where Pk is 
unmatched in MNE1 (note that Pk may be matched 
in M though). Now, let Q = (ai,pl,a2, ...,Pk) (i.e. 
al followed by Q'), and let M' = ]lJ \ {(al, M(al)}. 
The remaining argument follows the proof of 
Lemma 3.1. If Pk is unmatched in M' ,  M '  @ Q 
is more popular then M. Otherwise, Pk is matched 
in M'.  Let ak+l = M'(pk) and note that Pk 
f(ak+l). Remove (ak+l,pk) fi'om M' and then aug- 
ment M '  with Q. Select any pk+l c f(ak+x). If 
Pk+l is unmatched in M ~, we promote ak+l to Pk+l. 
Otherwise, we demote a = M'(Pk+l) to either l(a) 
(if a ¢ al),  or back to M(al) (if a = al), after 
which we can promote ak+l to Pk+l. It is clear 
from this that at least one of al and ah.+l prefers 
M '  to M. Also, at most one applicant (that is a) 
prefers M to M',  though in this case both al and 
ak+l prefer M'.  Hence, M '  is more popular than 
M. 
The three necessary conditions we have just derived 
form the basis of the following preliminary characteri- 
zation. 
LEMMA 3.5. A matching M is popular in G if and only 
if 
(i) 5I A E1 is a maximum matching of G1, and 
(ii) for each applicant a, M(a) E f(a) U s(a). 
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PTvof. Any popular matching necessarily satisfies con- 
ditions (i) and (ii) (by Lemmas 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4). It 
remains to show that together, these conditions are suf- 
ficient. 
Let M be any matching satisfying conditions (i) and 
(ii), and suppose for a contradiction that there is some 
matching M '  that is more popular than M. Let a be 
any applicant hat prefers M '  to M. We want to show 
that there is a distinct corresponding applicant a' that 
prefers M to M'.  
The graph H = (M ® M')  n E1 consists of disjoint 
cycles and paths, each alternating between edges in 
M Cl E1 and edges in M ~ N El. We claim that M'(a) 
must be contained in a non-empty path Q of H. First, 
note that M~(a) is an odd or unreachable node in G1, 
since a prefers M'(a) to M(a), and /l~/(a) E s(a) is a 
top-ranked even node of G1 in a's preference list. So 
by condition (i) and Lemma 3.2(b), M'(a) is matched 
in M n El .  However, M'(a) ~ M(a), so M'(a) is not 
isolated in H. Also, M~(a) cannot be in a cycle, since a 
is unmatched in M n El .  Therefore, Me(a) belongs to 
some non-empty path Q of H. 
Now, one endpoint of Q must be a (if M' (a)  E f(a)) 
or M~(a) (otherwise). So for each such applicant a, 
there is a distinct non-empty path Q. Since Me(a) is 
odd or unreachable, every post p in Q is also odd or 
unreachable. It follows from Lemma 3.1 that all such 
posts must be matched in M N El,  and so the other 
endpoint of Q is an applicant, say a ~. It is easy to see 
then that a' prefers M to M' ,  since M(a') E f(a'), while 
M'(a) ~ f(a'). 
Therefore, for every applicant a that prefers M ~ to 
M, there is a distinct corresponding applicant a ~ that 
prefers M to M'. Hence, M ~ is not more popular than 
M, giving the required contradiction. 
Given an instance graph G = (A u 79, E), we define 
the reduced graph G ~ = (A U 7 9, E ~) as the subgraph 
of G containing edges from each applicant a to posts 
in f(a) U s(a). We remark that G' need not admit an 
applicant-complete matching, since l(a) is now isolated 
whenever s(a) ¢ {l(a)}. 
Lemma 3.5 gives us that M is a popular matching 
of G if and only if M is a maximum matching on rank- 
one edges, and M belongs to the graph G ~. Recall that 
all popular matchings are applicant-complete through 
the introduction of last resorts. Hence, the following 
characterization is immediate. 
THEOREM 3.1. M is a popular matching of G if and 
only if 
(i) M O E1 is a maximum matching of G1, and 
(ii) M is an applicant-complete matching of the reduced 
g~nph G ~. 
3.2 A lgor i thmic  Resu l ts .  In this section, we 
present algorithm Popular-Matching (see Figure 4) for 
solving the popular matching problem. This algorithm 
is based on the characterization given in Theorem 3.1, 
and is similar to the algorithm for computing a rank- 
maximal matching [10]. 
Popu lar -Mateh ing(G = (.A tJ p,  E)) 
1. Construct he graph G' = (A O'P,E' ) ,  where E' = 
{(a,p) [ p e f(a) U s(a), a 6 A}. 
2. Compute a maximum matching M~ on rank-one dges 
i.e., M1 is a nmximum matching in G1 = (A U P, El). 
(M1 is also a matching in G ~ because E ~ ~ El) 
3. Delete all edges in G ~ connecting two nodes in the set O 
or a node in O with a node in////, where O and b/are the 
sets of odd and unreachable nodes of G1 = (.AU'P, El). 
Determine a maximum matching M in the modified 
graph G ~ by augmenting M~. 
4. If M is not applicant-complete, then declare that there 
is no popular matching in G. 
Else return M. 
Figure 4: O(~/C~,m) popular matching algorithm for 
preference lists with ties. 
The following lemma is necessary for the correctness 
of our algorithm. 
LEMMA 3.6. Algo~ithm PopulaT~Matching returns a 
maximum matching M on rank-one edges. 
Proof. Since M is obtained fi'om M1 by successive 
augmentations, every node matched by M1 is also 
matched by M. Nodes in O and /L/ are matched by 
M1 (by Lemma 3.2(b)). Hence, nodes in (.9 and/L/ are 
matched in M. 
First, we claim that G' has no edges of rank greater 
than one incident on nodes in O and nodes in/L/C/79. 
Let us consider any odd or unreachable node in 79. This 
is never a candidate for s(a), and hence no edge of the 
type (a,p),p E s(a) is incident on such a node. For odd 
nodes that belong to A, it is the case that they have 
first-ranked posts that are even, and so s(a) c_ f(a). 
This proves our claim. 
So the edges that we removed in Step 3 are rank-one 
edges, and these edges cannot be used by any maximum 
matching of G1, by Lemma 3.2(c). (So no popular 
matching of G can use these edges.) Now tile only 
neighbors of nodes in O are the even nodes of Gj (call 
this set E), and similarly, the only neighbors of nodes in 
/b/f3 79 are nodes in/L/n A (by our edge deletions in Step 
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3 and Lemma 3.2(c)). This means that M must match 
all the nodes in (.9 with nodes in g and all the nodes in 
b/N 7:' with nodes in//,/n .A. 
So M has at least IOI + lU n Pl = IOI + Ilgl/2 edges 
of rank one. So M is a maximum matching on rank-one 
edges (by Lemma 3.2(b)). 
Thus the matching returned by the algorithm 
Popular-Matching is both an applicant-complete match- 
ing in G ~, and a maximum matching on rank-one dges. 
The correctness of the algorithm now follows from The- 
orem 3.1. 
It is easy to see that the running time of out' 
algorithm is O (x/n'm): We use the algorithm of Hop croft 
and Karp [8] to compute a maxinmm matching in G1 
and identify the set of edges E '  and construct G' in 
O(v'nrn ) time. We then repeatedly augment M1 (by 
the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm) to obtain M. This gives 
us the following result. 
LEMMA 3.7. We can find a popular matching, or deter- 
mine that no such matching ezists, in O(v/nm ) time. 
It is now a simple matter to solve the maxinmm- 
cardinality popular matching problem. Let us assume 
that the instance G = (A tO P ,E )  admits a popular 
matching. (Otherwise, we are done.) We now want an 
applicant-complete matching in G' that is a maxirnum 
matching on rank-one edges and which maximizes the 
number of applicants not matched to their last resort. 
Let M'  be an arbitrary popular matching in G. We 
know that M'  belongs to the graph G'. Remove all 
edges of the form (a, l(a)) from G' (and M'). Call the 
resulting subgraph of G' as H. Note that M'  is still a 
maximum matching on rank-one edges since no rank- 
one edge has been deleted fi'om M'  or G', but M ~ need 
not be a maximum matching in the graph H. Determine 
a maximum matching N in H by augmenting Mq N is 
a matching in G' that is 
(i) a maximum matching on rank-one dges and 
(ii) matches the maximum number of non-last-resort 
posts. 
N need not be a popular matching. Determine a
maximum matching M in G' by augmenting N. The 
matching M will be applicant-complete. Since M is 
obtained from N by successive augmentations, all posts 
that are matched by N are still matched by M. Hence, 
it follows that M is a popular matching that maximizes 
the number of applicants not matched to their last 
resort. 
The following theorem is therefore immediate. 
t 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
1 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
2 986 988 996 997 1000 
3 898 941 962 983 996 
4 759 846 929 979 999 
5 681 811 915 979 998 
6 636 786 888 976 1000 
7 578 737 893 978 1000 
8 565 738 909 985 1000 
9 553 759 906 980 1000 
10 556 725 890 979 1000 
Table 1: Proportion of instances with a popular match- 
ing for n = 10. 
THEOREM 3.2. We can find a ma~imurn-cardinality 
popular matching, or determine that no such matching 
ezists, in O(v~m ) time. 
4 Conc lud ing  Remarks  and Open Prob lems 
In order to obtain an idea of the probability that a pop- 
ular matching exists, we performed some simulations. 
The factors that affect this probability are the number 
of applicants, the number of posts, the lengths of the 
preference lists, and the number, size, and position of 
ties in these lists. 
To keep this empirical investigation manageable, we 
restricted our attention to cases where the numbers 
of applicants and posts are equal, represented by n, 
and all preference lists have the same length k. We 
characterized the ties by a single parameter t, the 
probability that an entry in a preference list is tied with 
its predecessor. 
Tables 1 and 2 contains the results of simulations 
carried out on randomly generated instances with n = 
10 and n = 100 respectively. We set t to a sequence 
of values in the range 0.0 to 0.8. For n = 10 we 
allowed k to take all possible values (1, ..., 10), and for 
n = 100 we investigated the cases k = 1,...,10 and 
k = 20, 30, ..., 100. We generated 1000 random instances 
in each case. In both cases, the table shows the number 
of instances admitting a popular matching. 
These results, and others not reported in detail 
here, give rise to the following observations: 
• When t = 0.0, i.e. there are no ties, the likeli- 
hood of a popular matching declines rapidly as k 
increases, and for large 'n is negligible except for 
very small values of k. 
• Not surprisingly, increasing the value of t, and 
therefore the likely nmnber and length of ties, 
increases the probability of a popular matching. 
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t ¸ 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
1 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
2 997 1000 999 1000 1000 
3 884 956 985 990 1000 
4 519 807 925 946 974 
5 204 534 806 863 879 
6 64 346 685 782 798 
7 20 192 534 705 721 
8 8 90 436 628 672 
9 3 39 309 578 670 
10 2 28 243 531 675 
20 0 0 53 346 787 
30 0 0 37 302 776 
40 0 1 37 314 781 
50 0 0 44 291 791 
60 0 1 49 318 775 
70 0 2 36 304 780 
80 0 1 63 280 801 
90 0 0 38 306 776 
100 0 1 51 302 759 
Table 2: Proport ion of instances with a popular match- 
ing for n = 100. 
• For fixed n and t, increasing k initially reduces 
the likelihood of a popular matching, but beyond a 
certain range this effect all but disappears. 
Thus popular matchings do exist with good proba- 
bility when the chance of ties in the preference lists is 
high, which is likely to happen in real-world problems. 
We conclude with the following open problem. 
Suppose we have an instance that  admits a popular 
matching, but we already have a non-popular matching 
2910 in place. Since the more popular than relation is 
not transitive, it may be that  no popular matching is 
more popular than/~I0. We define a voting path then as 
a sequence of inatchings (M0, Mi, . . . ,  Mk) such that  hl~ 
is more popular than Mi-1 for all 1 < i < k, where/Vlk 
is popular. 
Even though the more popular than relation is not 
acyclic, we are able to show that  for every matching 
540, (i) there is a voting path beginning at M0, and (ii) 
the shortest such path has length at most 3. The ()pen 
problem is to give an efficient algorithm for comput- 
ing a shortest-length voting path fl'om a given matching. 
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